Hogan Lovells 2024 Election Impact and Congressional Outlook Report
Everybody knows that, logically, banks can fail. Few expect them to.
Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), the U.S.’s 16th largest bank, was closed on 10 March 2023, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) appointed as receiver. Signature Bank, New York, NY was closed on 12 March 2023 and again the FDIC was appointed as receiver. In the evening of 12 March 2023, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and FDIC released a joint statement announcing that all depositors of SVB and Signature Bank would have access to all of their deposits (including deposits that were not FDIC-insured). US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has indicated that similar actions could be warranted if smaller institutions suffer deposit runs, although she appears to have ruled out blanket protection of all deposits. On 13 March 2023, in an exercise of its powers under the Banking Act 2009, the Bank of England announced the acquisition of SVBUK by HSBC. And over the following eight days we saw the deterioration of Credit Suisse, culminating in the announcement that on 19 March 2023 UBS had agreed to acquire it for CHF3bn.
In this article we will look at some of the issues that should be considered when a deposit-taking bank regulated in the UK or the EU gets into financial difficulties. We have split the piece into the following segments, which you can navigate to by using the contents list on the right hand side of the article: a general introduction to resolution, practical issues relevant to all, and then practical issues from the viewpoint of a corporate depositor, a corporate borrower, a co-lender in a syndicate, a hedging counterparty, a holder of subordinated debt and a shareholder.
A number of readers will remember the banking crisis that started in 2007 and became known as the Global Financial Crisis, or GFC. This saw (amongst other events) the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the nationalisation of Hypo Real Estate, the bail-out of Dexia by France, Belgium and Luxembourg, the rescue takeover of HBOS by Lloyds Banking Group and the melt-down of Iceland’s main banks. Government funds were used to support or “bail out” distressed banks to an unprecedented extent.
Global regulators resolved that never again should tax payers’ money be used to bail-out banks that found themselves in financial difficulties. There should be an end to the concept of “too big to fail”.
Recognising that bank insolvency can pose a systemic risk to the wider economy, in 2014 Directive 2014/59 of the European Parliament and of the council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms – better known as the BRRD – came into effect, requiring EU Member States to introduce a special resolution regime (SRR) into national legislation1. The SRR would provide the resolution authorities (RAs) with pre-insolvency tools to deal with banks in financial difficulties. In the UK, the requirements of the BRRD were mainly implemented through the Banking Act 2009 and, importantly, the UK SRR has remained largely unchanged post-Brexit.
The SRR consists of five pre-insolvency resolution tools which can only be exercised once certain conditions have been satisfied. The main conditions are that the RAs are satisfied that the bank is failing or is likely to fail and it is not reasonably likely that action other than under the SRR will be taken in time to rescue the bank, and that exercise of the power is necessary having regard to the public interest.
The resolution tools are:
In the UK, there are also two special insolvency procedures for banks: the Bank Insolvency Procedure which is akin to liquidation, and the Bank Administration Procedure which can be used where part of the bank’s business has been transferred to a private sector purchaser, a bridge bank or an asset management vehicle. Certain EU Member States have introduced special insolvency procedures for banks, but generally banks will simply enter the insolvency proceedings available to corporates generally. This article does not consider bank insolvency procedures.
In certain conditions, including where the RAs are satisfied that the resolution conditions are satisfied and they’ve decided to exercise a resolution power, as a first step the RAs must undertake a write down or conversion of capital instruments (the Mandatory Conversion). This Mandatory Conversion process involves:
The cancellation, transfer, write-down and conversion under the BRRD (or the Banking Act 2009 in the UK) has to follow a strict hierarchy, as set out above, so equity is cancelled or transferred before any write down or conversion of AT1 or T2 instruments can take place, and AT1 instruments must be written down or converted before any action can be taken in relation to T2 instruments.
Mandatory Conversion is different from the bail-in option, even though they may both involve the write down or conversion of capital instruments. Under the bail-in option, the RAs must first write down or convert CET1, AT1 and T2 instruments as described above, but can then turn to other subordinated debt, and then any other liability that the bank may owe, other than certain excluded liabilities such as protected deposits or secured liabilities. Those liabilities can be written down in full or in part or converted into equity and the liability (or the agreement under which the liability arose) can be varied or suspended.
The recent agreement by UBS to acquire Credit Suisse (CS) (which (subject to expedited regulatory approval) is expected to close by the end of 2023) was accompanied by an instruction by FINMA to CS requiring CS to write down its AT1 instruments to zero (in contrast to the return that shareholders will receive on their equity). The statement from FINMA on 23 March 2023 clarified that the write-down of CS’s AT1 Instruments to zero was achieved not through the pre-resolution write-down of equity or capital instruments, but rather through the write-down mechanism contained in the contractual terms of the AT1 bonds and pursuant to emergency legislation under which, inter alia, FINMA was authorised to order CS to write down AT1 instruments. Swiftly after the announcement that the CS AT1 instruments were being written down in full, statements were published by EU and UK regulators confirming the creditor hierarchy in resolution as set out above - but the actions by the Swiss regulators have nonetheless caused consternation in the market.
The issues at SVB in the US and the UK, the failure of Signature Bank and the current market fluctuations in bank stocks will be making depositors think carefully about where their money is kept.
Is my money protected?
in the EU and the UK, under national implementation of the requirements of the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (2014/49/EU) and the Investor Compensation Schemes Directive (97/9/EC), accounts with credit balances of up to £85,000 / €100,000 (and joint accounts with a credit balance of up to £170,000 / €200,000) are protected (or “eligible”), meaning that if the bank is deemed unable for the time being to repay eligible deposits because of its financial status, a fund (being the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) in the UK) will pay out eligible depositors up to the guaranteed amount. The fund will then claim directly against the bank. However:
payments will not be made immediately and a certain period of waiting is likely (the Directive requires payment within 10 business days of a determination that the bank is deemed unable to repay eligible deposits, although that period will reduce over time and by the start of 2024 the period will be 7 business days);
Consider having accounts at more than one institution. Whilst administratively more burdensome, not putting all of your eggs in one basket has a number of benefits:
Accounts are already open should you want to move funds from one bank to another quickly;
Funds will still be available to you should one of your banks become distressed, which will help with liquidity at least in the short term;
Having a relationship with another bank may make it easier to discuss short term funding needs if required.
However, check your banking documentation – some banks require you to keep all deposits with them as a condition of any lending which may make opening accounts elsewhere difficult.
These are some of the points to consider if your lender is a stressed bank:
If your loan facility is not fully drawn, then:
If it is a bilateral loan, it is likely that the bank will not comply with any further drawdown request;
As a reaction to the GFC, changes were made to the LMA leveraged finance syndicated Facilities Agreements to address issues posed by “Defaulting Lenders” and “Impaired Agents”. These provisions are not contained in all LMA agreements (for example the investment grade documents), although the parties may agree to include equivalent provisions during negotiation:
In brief, a Defaulting Lender is defined as one which fails to fund its portion of a loan, or rescinds or repudiates a Finance Document. A lender will also be a Defaulting Lender if it suffers an Insolvency Event.
“Insolvency Event” is widely defined and includes an inability to pay debts, or the taking of any action under the SRR. However, national legislation implementing the BRRD in EU Member States (and the Banking Act 2009 in the UK) provides that anything in a contract which means the contract terms are or can be terminated, modified or replaced upon the taking of any action under the SRR is ineffective if the bank continues to perform its substantive obligations under the contract. Because of that, unless it qualifies as a Defaulting Lender under one of the other limbs of the definition, a bank which continues to perform its obligations cannot be treated as a Defaulting Lender even if it enters resolution.
Whilst a lender is a Defaulting Lender its rights change and a range of options becomes available to the borrower and other syndicate lenders including:
the cessation of any commitment fee on the Defaulting Lender’s undrawn commitment;
The Impaired Agent concept was introduced to protect borrowers and lenders against the risk that the Agent may get into financial difficulties. An Impaired Agent is one which fails to make a payment under the Finance Documents, or which is a Defaulting Lender or in respect of which an Insolvency Event occurs:
Whilst impaired, the Agent can be replaced, payments can be made by the lenders directly to the borrowers (and vice versa) and communications can take place directly between the parties rather than having to go through the Agent.
The distress of a syndicate member can be almost as concerning for co-lenders as it is for the borrower. Many of the points referred to above, such as the Defaulting Lender and Impaired Agent points, are also relevant for co-lenders. However, the following are also relevant:
There are several points to consider if your hedging counterparty with whom you have outstanding OTC derivatives transactions under an ISDA Master Agreement is in distress.
By suspending the obligation of the non-defaulting party to pay any amounts which may be owed under the ISDA Master Agreement, section 2(a)(iii) protects the non-defaulting party from the additional credit risk involved in performing its own obligations whilst the defaulting counterparty is unable to meet its own obligations. The High Court of England and Wales recently clarified2 that the insolvency Events of Default relate to factual events or states of affairs. The decision also provided clarity as to the extent to which and for how long a party can rely on this condition precedent to payment contained in the ISDA framework documentation where the other party is subject to an event of default (click here to read our article on this case).
However, as with loan agreements, national legislation implementing the BRRD in EU Member States (and the Banking Act 2009 in the UK) provides that anything in a contract which means the contractual terms are or can be terminated, modified or replaced upon the taking of any action under the SRR is ineffective if the bank continues to perform its substantive obligations under the contract. Accordingly, absent any other applicable Events of Default or Termination Events, the non-defaulting party would not be able to withhold performance, terminate or close-out simply because the bank has entered resolution.
Practical steps
The position is likely to be different depending on whether the bank is in resolution or not.
National legislation implementing the BRRD (and the Banking Act 2009 in the UK) states that as a precursor to resolution action by the RAs, CET1 instruments must be transferred or cancelled before ATI or T2 instruments are written down or converted, and ATI instruments must be converted or written down before action is taken in relation to T2 instruments. This write down and conversion power can also be exercised by the RAs independently of resolution action provided the conditions for resolution have been met. This order in which losses must be borne – first by CET1, then AT1 and then T2 - is the creditor hierarchy in resolution.
Compensation may be payable based upon principle that no creditor should be worse off (NCWO) where a bank is in resolution than it would be in an insolvency.
Practical steps
Prior to the exercise of one of the resolution options, the RAs are required to write down equity in the bank. In the resolution creditor hierarchy in the EU and the UK, shareholders are the first to suffer loss. Examples of this in action include the merger in 2017 of Banco Popular Español SA with Santander (under which the SRB3 wrote down the ordinary shares and AT1 instruments issued by BPE, converted T2 instruments into shares and transferred those shares to Santander) and in 2023 the acquisition by HSBC of Silicon Valley Bank UK (under which the UK RAs wrote down the AT1 and T2 instruments to zero and sold the share for £1).
Shares can also be transferred under the resolution tools without the consent or any involvement of the shareholder – again, as evidenced by the acquisition of SVBUK by HSBC.
Shareholders may be entitled to compensation under the NCWO principle referred to above.
There have been comparisons drawn between what is currently happening to the banking sector and the issues that arose in the banking market during the GFC. However, notwithstanding recent turmoil, the sector is still better positioned than it was in 2008, with better documentation, better supervision, stronger capital requirements, higher liquidity requirements and specific tools available for resolution. That said, improvements can always be made. We have already seen press reports that the EU will accelerate proposed changes under which capital and liquidity requirements will be amended to implement more fully Basel III. The UK authorities are reportedly thinking again about whether to relax certain elements of bank regulation. And it will be interesting to see what approach the US takes, as it has already agreed to stand behind all deposits at certain banks. Only time will tell whether the SRR is indeed fit for purpose. It is certainly being tested at the moment!
This note is intended to be a general guide and covers complex questions of law and practice. It does not constitute legal advice.
Authored by Margaret Kemp, Susan Whitehead, Claire Ellis, Isobel Wright, Jane Griffiths, Charlotte Bonsch, Christian Hentrich