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Trump Administration Executive Order (EO) Tracker
The World Bank Group (WBG) recently revised two key sanctions system procedures to account for 10 to 15 years of sanctions case development and issue management. Companies and individuals participating in WBG-financed projects should become familiar with the revisions, many of which codify pre-existing practices, and assess their strategies on risk mitigation, sanctions litigation, and M&A. We outline notable revisions below to help companies ensure alignment with their compliance policies and mitigate the risk of WBG sanctions.
The WBG Sanctioning Guidelines (Sanctioning Guidelines) and the Bank Procedure: Sanctions Proceedings and Settlements in Bank Financed Projects (Sanctions Procedure) govern the architecture, rules, and procedures of the sanctions system.1 In November 2023, WBG revised the Sanctions Procedure, and in October 2024 the Sanctioning Guidelines. The Procedure and Guidelines were last revised in 2016 and 2011, respectively.
Two November 2023 revisions in the Sanctions Procedure stand out.
The Office of Suspension and Debarment (OSD) may now withhold sensitive evidence in certain situations upon request by the Integrity Vice Presidency (INT), as long as the withheld evidence does not restrict a respondent’s ability to meaningfully defend themselves.
INT’s request must show that the life, health, safety, or well-being of a person (including data privacy considerations per the World Bank Group Personal Data Privacy Policy2) would be endangered, the evidence would prejudice a WBG Voluntary Disclosure Program participant, or the disclosure would be prohibited under WBG Staff Rules.
If OSD grants INT’s request, OSD must notify the respondent that certain materials have been withheld in the Notice of Sanctions Proceedings. The Sanctions Procedure do not clarify if OSD is expected to only state that certain materials have been withheld, or also describe the contents of these materials. The latter would further promote fairness and transparency of the sanctions proceedings.
The Sanctions Board must review OSD’s withholding decision de novo should the respondent file a Response. If the Sanctions Board rules that the evidence should not have been withheld, INT may withdraw it, redact it, or subject it to in camera review, or withdraw the case in its entirety.
This new process resolves the rare situation under the 2016 Sanctions Procedure in which INT would submit heavily redacted materials to OSD, limiting the respondents’ ability to defend themselves. In the past, a respondent could only challenge redactions before the Sanctions Board, thereby potentially depriving respondents of a defined process earlier in the proceeding by which to challenge redactions – thus hampering their ability to defend themselves. Although challenging redactions has remained the same in the current Procedure, the revisions now provide the sanctions units and respondents an alternative more structured process and criteria that specify how and when evidence may be withheld.
One could criticize the “meaningful defense” standard for veering from the almost universal right of a defendant to access all inculpatory and exculpatory evidence and for potentially assigning more value to privacy rights of third parties.
The WBG would likely respond that WBG sanctions are administrative – not criminal – proceedings and that, in any event, most legal systems have mechanisms to protect the identities of witnesses when their safety could be endangered. The WBG could also emphasize that OSD and the Sanctions Board are independent decision-makers whose roles are to ensure fairness in the sanctions process.
The revised Sanctions Procedure establish a framework for extending sanctions to companies determined to be successors of previously sanctioned entities. This addition seeks to mitigate the risk of sanctions evasion by creating a new company in order to continue to receive WBG financing.
The revised Procedure define “successor” as an entity that continues to carry out a significant part of the business operations of a sanctioned entity, which is consistent with the “concept of economic successorship” used previously.3 INT may now submit a “Statement of Successorship” to the SDO explaining the grounds and evidence for extending the sanctions to the entity INT considers to be a successor. OSD may issue a Notice of Successorship, against which the alleged successor can submit its objections in a “Clarification” within 15 days. OSD’s decision can be appealed to the Sanctions Board.
This process appears to be in response to Sanctions Board Decision No. 101, a 2017 decision in which the Board observed that the Sanctions Procedure lacked a definition of the term “successor” and a clear understanding of how to determine what entities are considered successors, which made it challenging for the WBG to balance fair sanctions and sanctions evasion.4
Sanctioned entities that undertake changes in corporate structure should carefully assess the effect of these changes on their sanction. They should also be aware of the possibility that they may receive a Notice of Successorship as well as the ambitious 15-day deadline to respond.
Companies that consider acquisitions should be aware of the risk extension, which underscores the need for thorough due diligence that specifically covers WBG sanctions and participation in WBG-financed projects. The compliance and risk functions should incorporate these considerations into the M&A diligence processes to mitigate integrity risks.5 Should a buyer acquire a WBG sanctioned entity, companies and their counsel may be able to negotiate with INT a limited extension of the sanction to the buyer.
The Sanctioning Guidelines are another key WBG sanctions system policy, which was updated in October 2024. The Guidelines assist decision-makers on considerations that the WBG believes are relevant to deciding whether an entity should be sanctioned, and, if so, what sanction should be imposed.6
Most updates can generally be divided into (1) additions, (2) codification of previously-implemented practices, and (3) clarifications. We list below some of the more notable below, many of which will be helpful in crafting mitigation arguments during the sanctions process.
The changes to the Sanctioning Guidelines and the Sanctions Procedure have not introduced any revelations to the WBG’s sanctioning framework. However, companies receiving WBG financing should be aware of these recent developments and remain vigilant against corruption and fraud in order to avoid sanctions. Individuals and companies should seek competent counsel to assist them in understanding the sanctions framework and guide them through these revisions, as well as ensure that their compliance policies and practices align with leading practices and applicable rules, particularly the WBG’s Integrity Compliance Guidelines.
Authored by Peter Spivack, Nikolaos Doukellis, and Cameryn Lonsway.
References
1 WBG combats fraud, corruption, collusion, and other types of misconduct in WBG-financed projects through the use of administrative sanctions. The sanctions system reviews allegations of misconduct to ensure that funds entrusted to the WBG’s constituents are used for their intended purpose. The sanctions system includes four units: (1) the Integrity Vice Presidency (INT); (2) the Office of Suspension and Debarment (OSD); (3) the World Bank Sanctions Board; and (4) the Integrity Compliance Office (ICO). INT investigates alleged misconduct and refers cases to the OSD to assess the evidence and determine whether sanctions should be imposed. OSD sanctions may be appealed to the Sanctions Board, which reviews cases de novo. At any point in this process, the respondent may negotiate a settlement with the INT. Lastly, the ICO – an operationally independent unit housed within INT – monitors the compliance of sanctioned entities with their imposed sanction.
For more information on navigating a WBG investigation, access our recent article: Peter Spivack et al., World Bank Group Investigations Unit expands: Steps companies can take to mitigate sanctions risks, available at: https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/world-bank-group-investigations-unit-expands-steps-companies-can-take-to-mitigate-sanctions-risks.
2 World Bank Group, World Bank Group Personal Data Privacy Policy, available at: https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/943057e81239587a70c5a6bc39532728-0240012021/original/ca36fdc451914d89a49d6189a98bad86.pdf.
3 The World Bank Sanctions Board, Sanctions Board Decision No. 101, ¶ 10 (2017), available at: https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/documents/sanctions/sanctions-board/2018/nov/SanctionsBoardDecisionNo-101.pdf.
4 Id.
5 Peter Spivack et al., DOJ updates guidance on Corporate Compliance Programs, available at: https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/doj-updates-guidance-on-corporate-compliance-programs.
6 The baseline sanction is a three-year debarment with conditional release. Other types of sanctions are debarment without conditions, indefinite debarment, conditional non-debarment, letter of reprimand, and restitution. Aggravating and mitigating factors may affect the duration of a sanction.
7 The 2011 Guidelines stated, “Prior history can include debarments by another MDB” (emphasis added). The 2024 revisions state, “The prior history must also have resulted in a sanction or penalty imposed by the WBG or another Multilateral Development Bank where debarment decisions may be enforced” (emphasis added).
8 The cross-debarment agreement provides that if a Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) that is party to the agreement debars a firm or individual, all the other MDBs will do the same. The parties to the agreement are: the African Development Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank Group, and the World Bank Group. Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions, Sept. 17, 2006, available at: https://lnadbg4.adb.org/oai001p.nsf/0/F77A326B818A19C548257853000C2B10/$FILE/cross-debarment-agreement.pdf.
9 Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Enforcement Division of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, FCPA: A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1, 27 (2d ed. 2020), available at: https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-fraud/file/1292051/dl?inline.
10 World Bank Group, Summary of Integrity Compliance Guidelines, available at: https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/06476894a15cd4d6115605e0a8903f4c-0090012011/original/Summary-of-WBG-Integrity-Compliance-Guidelines.pdf.