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German merger control has traditionally excluded mere employee recruitment from its scope. However, a recent high-profile case has sparked debate and legal uncertainty over whether direct hiring could trigger notification requirements – with some commentators suggesting that the Federal Cartel Office may have changed its view. Far from it. Prevailing law confirms the view that direct hiring of employees alone, without the involvement of the former employer or the acquisition of any other assets or shares, does not amount to a notifiable concentration. Nonetheless, companies will do well to watch the evolving enforcement landscape – and to structure recruitment campaigns with an eye to where the legal fault lines may emerge.
Merger control remains a robust pillar of German competition enforcement – and one the Federal Cartel Office (FCO) has never hesitated to invoke. But what is notifiable? In a recent case from the AI sector, the FCO declared in a press release: “Taking over employees may be subject to merger control in Germany.” The statement sent ripples through the legal community. Some have interpreted it to mean that direct hiring could now constitute a notifiable concentration – potentially equating the recruitment of skilled personnel with an “acqui-hire” (meaning the act of buying an entire company primarily for its talent) or even a full-blown merger. In this view, employment alone – even absent asset transfers or corporate ties – might amount to the acquisition of "control" over a business.
But can pure employment decisions really be brought within the jurisdictional scope of German merger control? Or does the FCO’s use of the word "may" indicate that only narrow, specific scenarios are covered – and that pure employee hiring remains exempt? In this article, we take the latter view: Unless and until the legislature amends the law, direct hiring continues to lie outside the boundaries of merger review.
The idea that hiring employees might engage German merger control is not entirely novel. The FCO has previously encountered cases involving talent transfers – and its approach has historically been one of restraint. Indeed, past decisions suggest a clear distinction between hiring personnel and acquiring businesses.
Take, for instance, the illustrative case of WAZ/Ostthüringer Nachrichten. After the FCO prohibited WAZ’s acquisition of a minority stake in a regional newspaper publisher in the year 2000, the company launched a competing newspaper title – and promptly offered positions to most of the target’s editorial and administrative staff. The employees accepted, the target exited the market, and the FCO… did nothing. Despite the market impact, no further action was taken, and no new concentration was assumed. A more recent example is the CTS Eventim/Four Artists case, where the prohibition of a planned merger was followed by the acquirer establishing a new company – and hiring large swathes of the target’s workforce. Here too, the FCO refrained from intervening. The FCO’s president publicly confirmed that hiring employees alone did not trigger the merger control regime.
However, this precedent-driven clarity has now been unsettled. In the abovementioned AI sector press release, the FCO stated that “the takeover of all employees together with the accompanying agreements on financing and the use of intellectual property rights to constitute a merger which is generally subject to merger control in Germany”. It declined, however, to specify whether it viewed the case as an asset acquisition under Section 37(1) No. 1 ARC or as a control acquisition under No. 2 – nor did it elaborate on what distinguished the scenario from those previously examined. This absence of clarity has left commentators and stakeholders guessing.
Time, then, to look more closely at what German merger law has to say about these cases.
Direct recruitment of employees does not entail any acquisition of shares, participations, or structural combinations between undertakings. Accordingly, Sections 37(1) Nos. 3 and 4 ARC – which address the acquisition of shareholdings and combinations allowing for material competitive influence – will not apply. That leaves only two possible paths for scrutiny under German merger control:
The first question, then, is whether a recruitment effort – even one involving a coordinated move of key personnel – could qualify as an asset deal within the meaning of Section 37(1) No. 1 ARC. This provision presupposes that an undertaking acquires either all or a substantial part of another’s assets. In this context, two interrelated questions arise:
The term “asset” generally refers to something that can be traded, assigned, or transferred in a way that enables the acquirer to make ongoing use of it. On this view, assets are identifiable, alienable and capable of yielding sustained competitive value.
Whether employees meet these criteria is a matter of debate. Unlike machines or databases, employees are not disposed of by their current employer, nor are they typically “acquired” in a transactional sense. Their employment decisions are voluntary and individual, shaped by factors such as compensation, role, and working environment – not by agreements between undertakings. Yet, arguably, this does not entirely resolve the matter. Some have suggested that in direct hiring cases, the know-how and customer relationships brought by key individuals could amount to intangible assets which are (indirectly) transferred to the new employer. It has been acknowledged in the case law and the literature that know-how and customer relationships can indeed form assets relevant for merger control.
However, the nature of these intangibles complicates matters. Know-how in direct hiring cases is typically embedded in individuals, not separable from them. Similarly, client relationships often depend on personal rapport and may not persist under new employment. This raises doubts as to whether such attributes can be treated as transferrable “assets” in the conventional sense. Moreover, courts and commentators have thus far addressed know-how and customer relationships only in the context of broader transactional frameworks – where personnel moves are accompanied by formal transfer agreements between a buyer and seller and additional operational components such as tangible or separately available intangible assets. But in the absence of a seller, a transfer agreement, or accompanying business infrastructure, the case for treating direct hiring (that is, mere personnel recruitment) as an asset acquisition is far less clear-cut.
Assuming for a moment that know-how or client goodwill held by employees could qualify as assets, another hurdle remains: whether these assets are acquired in the sense required by merger control law. Section 37(1) No. 1 ARC requires the full transfer of ownership rights (called Vollrechtserwerb in German), enabling the acquirer to assume the seller’s legal and economic position in a lasting manner. This raises a fundamental question: does an employment relationship give the new employer such a position with respect to the employee’s know-how and commercial relationships?
In one view, the employer obtains structured access to such intangible value through its right to direct the employee’s work. The new employer’s influence over these “assets” is the same as that of the previous employer. Indeed, over the course of the employment, the employer may benefit considerably from the skills and networks the employee brings. Yet important caveats remain. Employees retain a high degree of personal autonomy and can generally terminate their contracts at short notice. As a result, even if such intangibles were to be considered “assets”, it is doubtful whether a “full transfer” takes place. Unlike licenses, trademarks, or proprietary databases, employee-held intangibles are neither formally assigned nor durably acquired. They remain personal, and their accessibility can change with little notice. Whether this qualifies as a Vollrechtserwerb in the merger control sense remains subject to debate.
The final element under Section 37(1) No. 1 ARC is the requirement that the acquirer take over “all or a substantial part” of another undertaking’s assets. In merger control terms, this is understood to mean that the acquired assets must form the foundation of a certain market presence of the transferor – such that the acquirer can assume, replicate, or continue these business activities.
It is this criterion which, irrespective of the uncertainties surrounding the other parts of the “concentration” definition, differentiates direct hiring from actual asset deals, where buyer and seller consciously transfer a bundle of assets. Viewed separately, it is not conceivable how a single employee could ever be found to represent a substantial part of an employer’s assets in the legal sense (and, in any event, the turnover or value thresholds of Section 35 ARC will never be met by one hire alone, as this would require such person to have a “price tag” of at least EUR 400 million and/or be solely responsible for at least EUR 500 million worth of turnover). Hence, direct hiring could fall under German merger control only if multiple individual hires were aggregated into one notifiable transaction.
Statutory aggregation is possible under Section 38(5) sentence 3 ARC (mirroring Article 5(2) EUMR), which combines asset acquisitions from the same seller to the same buyer within two years. Pure hiring, however, involves no “seller”: the former employer neither transfers assets nor participates in the employees’ decisions. Furthermore, employees do not “sell” themselves as assets; they only offer services for the duration of their employment contract. Consequently, this provision cannot consolidate individual employment contracts.
German case law offers a further route: separate acquisitions may be lumped together when, from an economic point of view, they are brought about by a single event that is likely to influence the market structure (BGH KVR 95/10; OLG Düsseldorf VI-Kart 5/16 (V)). While EU jurisprudence usually demands contractual interdependence in that regard, German courts are less rigid. Yet in hiring scenarios, what counts as the “single event”? Employees exercise constitutionally protected freedom of occupation and decide on employers for personal reasons – salary, career prospects, commuting, work-life balance – rarely in lockstep with colleagues. Employment contracts are neither mutually conditional nor synchronized in their execution, and there is no coordinated act between old and new employers.
Treating the new employer’s unilateral ambition to hire en masse as the requisite “event” would ignore precedent and the fundamentally decentralized nature of the relationships: The court decisions concerned cases where there were a single buyer and seller who agreed on the acquisition of legally distinct businesses based on a “uniform entrepreneurial decision.” This underscores that an entrepreneurial decision alone is insufficient; specific transactional interactions between the companies involved must occur. Direct hiring starkly contrasts with this scenario, as it involves independent, individual decisions made by private individuals rather than structured negotiations between undertakings.
Furthermore, collapsing autonomous employment choices into an artificial mega-transaction would not just distort reality but also destabilize the boundaries of the notification regime: Every subsequent opportunistic hire could be swept into the supposed transaction, rendering threshold predictions impossible and contradicting the accepted view that even serial acquirers’ strategic motives do not, by themselves, aggregate separate deals into one filing obligation. It would be inconsistent to treat direct hiring differently.
Beyond asset acquisitions, Section 37(1) No. 2 ARC offers a second potential route for merger review: the acquisition of control over all or part of one or more undertakings. The latter term aligns closely with the interpretation of 'substantial part of the assets' in Section 37(1) No. 1 ARC. Central to both concepts is whether the object of acquisition represents a market presence transferable to the acquiring entity. Importantly, the control must be acquired on a lasting basis.
At first glance, it might seem a stretch to view direct recruitment as conferring “control” over anything resembling a business unit. No corporate link is established, no entity is absorbed, and the hiring employer gains no rights over the structure or decision-making processes of the previous employer. Still, some have queried whether, in cases involving the transfer of specialized teams or strategic personnel, the new employer might obtain control over a functionally distinct part of the former employer’s undertaking – in effect, transplanting a self-contained activity from one corporate context into another.
The line of reasoning here is complex. While an employer may gain contractual rights over the services of an employee, this is different from acquiring control over a business. Employees retain autonomy over whether and how long to stay. They may leave, refuse to share prior knowledge, or otherwise resist integration. The legal and practical nature of such arrangements is inherently fluid – and, crucially, not shaped by a mutual transactional commitment between two undertakings. That said, German merger law does recognize that licensing, leasing, or supply agreements – assets frequently acquired in conventional M&A transactions – can be a means of acquiring control even though they often permit unilateral termination by the contractual partner without the acquirer's agreement.
Ultimately, the treatment of direct hiring depends on whether it is treated as sufficiently analogous – or fundamentally distinct – from such other contractual arrangements. The distinguishing factor remains the unique position of the “asset” itself, which here retains the agency to independently determine the continuity of its status.
In any event, however, the logic applied to asset acquisitions under Section 37(1) No. 1 ARC carries over. Since the respective terms correspond to each other, individual employment contracts will neitherform a substantial part of the former employer’s assets, nor will they constitute a distinct part of its undertaking. At the same time, the concept of a single transaction, suitable to bundle the individual decisions of various employees, does not apply either. There is no sufficient legal basis for aggregating independently concluded employment contracts – even if executed concurrently – into a coherent (part of a) business over which control could be acquired. To put it differently: In merger control terms, direct hiring is not about acquiring control over an existing business – but (re-)starting one’s own.
It follows that employee recruitment as such is not a case for German merger control. For the sake of legal certainty – and in light of the fines attached to violations of merger notification rules – the FCO should reaffirm this interpretation. This would not only be consistent with established case law, but also in keeping with the principle that legal provisions carrying sanctions must not be expanded by analogy or creative interpretation beyond their statutory wording and purpose.
Critics might argue that such doctrinal restraint opens the door to strategic behavior – with companies sidestepping scrutiny by recruiting talent rather than acquiring companies. However, not every disruptive commercial strategy warrants intervention under merger law, or indeed competition law in general, especially where the effects stem from competition on the merits. As such, employment contracts are merely the outcome of working competition for input factors (labor) – and if there are suspicions that they veer into anti-competitive territory, alternative legal tools exist. The rules on abuse of dominance (Sections 19 and 20 ARC, Article 102 TFEU) provide a framework to assess hiring strategies that may amount to exclusionary conduct. Likewise, unfair competition law (Lauterkeitsrecht, UWG) places limits on targeted poaching, particularly where it crosses into harassment or disloyal inducement. These avenues may be better suited to address the competitive concerns arising from employee mobility – without straining the merger control framework beyond its structural focus and impeding employee moves based on mandatory ex ante reviews prohibiting their implementation.
If policymakers should wish to nonetheless bring certain hiring strategies within the scope of merger control, doing so would require more than interpretative creativity – it would necessitate legislative reform. Such reform would have to grapple with a series of challenging questions, both legal and conceptual. To name just a few:
But even without such reform, the picture remains muddled in practice. The FCO’s position in the AI Case – although not elaborated in detail – suggests that transactions involving more than mere recruitment may fall within scope of German merger control: the crucial factor may have been alignment between the former and new employers. Reports suggest that the previous employer contractually waived its rights to challenge the new employer’s recruitment, arguably signifying consent to the transfer of the employees. Additionally, the two companies entered into agreements on the financing of the new employer’s future business operations and licensing of IP.
While it would be highly desirable for the Federal Supreme Court to rule on that matter, the rule of thumb emerging from current practice seems to be: Where hiring is combined with IP transfers, business-critical infrastructure, or cooperation by the former employer, the threshold of a concentration may be crossed. In other words: The more a deal resembles a classic asset or control acquisition, the more merger control becomes a risk. Notably, this view aligns with signals from Brussels. DG COMP officials have recently suggested that employee transfers, when accompanied by significant intangibles such as key IP or proprietary know-how, may amount to an acquisition of control under Article 3 EUMR. A recently published EU Commission report on the Digital Markets Act (DMA) echoes this sentiment, noting that whether a talent-related transaction “constitutes a concentration within the meaning of Article 3 [EUMR] is not always clear and may require a thorough case-by-case analysis.”
What follows now is a need for heightened attentiveness. While companies remain free to compete for talent, they would do well to watch the evolving enforcement landscape – and to structure recruitment campaigns with an eye to where the legal fault lines may emerge. Where there is no transaction, no transfer, and no coordination, the case for merger control remains weak. But where hiring forms part of a wider constellation of arrangements, scrutiny may well follow.
Authored by Anne-Kathrin Lauer, and Florian von Schreitter.
For further details, you can find an expanded version of this article here.