Supreme Court to address class certification and Article III standing

The case at issue is called Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, dba Labcorp v. Luke Davis, et al., Case No. 22-55873. Plaintiffs are visually impaired individuals who claim they were denied equal access to touchscreen check-in kiosks at Labcorp facilities. Plaintiffs brought claims—individually and on behalf of a class of thousands of other allegedly similarly situated visually impaired individuals—against Labcorp. Plaintiffs seek damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act, California’s Unruh Act, and other related statutes.  

Plaintiffs moved to certify a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3) that included “all legally blind individuals in California who visited a Labcorp patient service center in California and were denied full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations due to Labcorp's failure to make its e-check-in kiosks accessible to legally blind individuals.”  

In opposing class certification, Labcorp argued that Plaintiffs could not show Article III standing for each class member, because they could not demonstrate that each class member personally encountered—and were unable to use or discouraged from using—Labcorp’s kiosks. The District Court nevertheless certified the damages class.

On interlocutory appeal under Rule 23(f), Labcorp argued that the District Court should not have certified the class because it could not show that all putative class members had suffered an Article III injury. Labcorp cited the Supreme Court’s statement in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez that “[e]very class member must have Article III standing in order to recover individual damages.” 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021). Labcorp explained that certification was inappropriate because there was reason to believe that a substantial portion of individuals falling within the class definition are uninjured and thus lack standing under Article III. 

The Ninth Circuit affirmed class certification, ruling that it did not matter “that some potential class members may not have been injured” because, under Ninth Circuit law, Rule 23 does not bar “certification of a class that potentially includes more than a de minimis number of uninjured class members.” Davis v. Lab’y Corp. of Am. Holdings, No. 22-55873, 2024 WL 489288, at *2 n.1 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2024). According to the Ninth Circuit, as long as the named plaintiff suffered an individual Article III injury, that was sufficient for class certification.

The Ninth Circuit’s ruling is but one of many decisions in recent years taking different approaches to evaluating whether a class may be certified when some of the proposed class members have not suffered an Article III injury. Indeed, as Labcorp describes it in its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari: 

Broadly speaking, when faced with the question of how many uninjured people can be in a putative class, the circuits break into three camps. Some say none, holding that Article III bars certification where the class includes anyone who lacks standing; others say just a de minimis amount, holding that Rule 23(b)(3) permits nothing greater; and the rest say anything less than a really big number, holding that problems involving uninjured class members can usually be resolved down the road.

The Supreme Court is now tasked with deciding which approach is best, or crafting a new approach to address the issue. Whichever way the Supreme Court rules, it is likely to impact a large swath of pending class actions. In the short term, district courts may delay ruling on class certification where a putative class contains uninjured members. If the Supreme Court holds that a class may not be certified that contains uninjured class members, it may make class certification more difficult in jurisdictions—such as the Seventh and Ninth Circuits—that have permitted such classes to be certified. Conversely, if the Supreme Court holds that a class may be certified that contains uninjured class members, it may make class certification easier in jurisdictions—such as the First Circuit and the D.C. Circuit—that have taken a more restrictive view of class certification. The Supreme Court’s decision may provide an opportunity to revisit class certification in cases where a class has already been certified, including by providing grounds for a motion for decertification under Rule 23.

The Supreme Court has set an expedited briefing schedule so that it may decide the case this Term.  Petitioner’s opening brief is due on March 5, 2025; Respondents’ briefs are due on March 31, 2025; and Petitioner’s reply brief is due on April 21, 2025. For parties interested in providing their views in this important case, amicus briefs in support of Petitioners will be due on March 12, and amicus briefs in support of Respondents will be due on April 7. The Court has not yet set a date for argument, but we expect argument to take place in late April, with a decision issued by the end of June.

Hogan Lovells can help

As one of the premier class action litigation firms in the United States, Hogan Lovells has deep experience litigating and advising on thorny class certification issues. In recent years, we have successfully defeated class certification motions, successfully decertified classes, and successfully appealed class certification rulings pursuant to Rule 26(f).  We have been at the forefront of litigating the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion on class certification, and we are ready to support our clients as they navigate the impact of the Labcorp decision.

Authored by Adam K. Levin, Katie Wellington, and James Yates.